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THORNS IN THEIR SIDES:
COURTS AND THEIR CRITICS IN FLORIDA
D. GRIER STEPHENSON, JR.*
Since the earliest years of the Republic, the legal issue of construc-
tive contempt has pitted personality against principle and piety against
politics.' Florida has been no exception to this rule. Most recently,
the debate over the authority of judges to restrict out-of-court com-
mentary has occurred in the arena of the fair trial-free press dispute.2
But if contemporary discussions revolve around the probable effects
of pretrial and trial publicity on potential and empaneled jurors,
American state and federal court reports confirm that the power of
constructive contempt was historically employed to protect judges, not
jurors, from scandal, pressure, and attack. For a very long time the
question, simply put, was whether a judge had the authority to fine
or imprison for remarks concerning him or his court made outside the
courtroom.
*Associate Professor of Government, Franklin & Marshall College, Lancaster,
Pennsylvania. A.B., Davidson College (1964); M.A., Princeton University (1966); Ph.D.,
Princeton University (1967).
1. For a recent treatment of contempt in all its facets, see R. GOLDFARB, THE CON-
TEMPT POWER (1963). Other treatments include J. MORGAN, THE LAW OF LITERATURE
(1875); S. RAPALJE, A TREATISE ON CONTEMPT (1884); C. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CON-
TEMPT OF COURT (1934); J. THOMAS, THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE CONTEMPT (1904); Beale,
Contempt of Court, Criminal and Civil, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161 (1908); Dobbs, Contempt
of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183 (1971); Gregory, The Courts and Free
Speech, 8 ILL. L. REV. 141 (1913); Hughes, Contempt of Court and the Press, 16 L.
QUARTERLY REV. 292 (1900); Larremore, Constitutional Regulation of Contempt of
Court, 13 HARV. L. REV. 615 (1900); Worth, Contempt of Court, 37 CENTRAL L.J. 273,
294 (1893).
2. In Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976), the Supreme Court un-
animously invalidated a "gag" order which had been issued by a Nebraska trial judge
to restrain press coverage of a murder trial. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a majority
of the court, left open the possibility that such bans on press coverage might be
appropriate under some circumstances; that possibility, however, seems slight because
the opinion formulates standards which will be almost impossible to meet. In a con-
curring opinion, Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stewart stated their view that prohibi-
tions on the reporting of judicial proceedings constitute prior restraints and are
constitutionally impermissible under any circumstances. Id. at 2809. In separate con-
curring opinions, Justices White and Stevens indicated that they leaned to the latter
viewpoint, but were unwilling to adopt it unless later cases showed the necessity of
doing so. Id. at 2808, 2830. See also Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 67 A.2d 497 (Md.
1949); ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING
TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (1968); ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS, RECOMMENDED COURT PROCEDURE TO ACCOMMODATE RIGHTS OF FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS (Revised Draft, 1975); Landau & Roney, Fair Trial and Free Press: A Due
Process Proposal, 62 A.B.A.J. 55 (1976); Note, Free Press and Fair Trial: An Evolving Con-
troversy, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 660 (1967); Note, Contempt by Publication, 59 YALE L.J.
534 (1950).
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Florida's first statutory limitation on contempt dated from 1828,
only a few years after the cession of the territory by Spain to the
United States in 1819. It provided that the territorial courts would
have the power to punish contempts, but that "any thing said or
written or published in vacation, to or of any Judge, or of any
decision made by a Judge, shall not in any case be construed to be
a contempt. ' 3 Most of the original wording of this statute remains in
the published laws to the present day.4 The Florida limiting statute,
then, granted contempt power to the courts, but excluded from the
scope of the power spoken or published remarks about a judge or a
case while the court was not in term. Presumably, under the wording
of the law, remarks made during a term of court were subject to
punishment even if they did not relate to a pending case. The statute
contained a temporal limitation, but avoided any geographical limita-
tion, unlike a contemporary federal statute.5
Early Florida legal history is a topic to which few writers have
devoted much attention and effort. The sources are too few and too
weak to determine conclusively from the temper and learning of the
times the reasons for adopting the 1828 Act. One incident, however,
occurred in 1824 which could have had a causal connection with the
passage of the statute 4 years later. Attorneys Fry and Steele of the
United States District Court for Florida published an incorrect account
of the proceedings of a court, and the trial judge cited them both for
contempt. The published account accused Judge Brackenridge of
"'pocketing the presentments of the grand jury without permitting
them to be seen or read, and threatening the district attorney with
dismissal or imprisonment, for simply moving that they might be
filed.' " The judge stated in his opinion that
contempts are punishable by all courts, where the common law
prevails:-that the misrepresentation of proceedings in courts of
justice are invariably considered as offences against the court ....
If any one is at liberty to vilify the administration of justice, and
to pervert and misrepresent the acts of the courts, so as to excite
odium and distrust, the courts may as well be closed, and leave
everything to lawless violence, and unprincipled detraction. 7
3. Act of November 23, 1828, COMPILATION OF THE PUBLIC ACTS OF THE LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL OF THE TERRITORY OF FLORIDA 90 (Duval 1839).
4. See FLA. STAT. § 38.23 (1975).
5. The federal statute of 1831 limited summary punishment to acts committed in
the presence of the court "or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice." Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487.
6. As quoted in A. STANSBURY, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF JAMES H. PECK 352 (1972).
7. Id. at 353 (emphasis in original).
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Judge Brackenridge's opinion centered around what judges have
called the integrity argument for contempt of court. That is, to be
contemptuous, out-of-court comment did not have to relate to pending
cases; the words simply had to demonstrate, in the eyes of the judge,
a lack of respect for the dignity of the court.
Measuring the influence and impact of the Fry-Steele incident on
the bar of Florida would be an impossible task. However, the fact
that the territorial legislature adopted a contempt statute 4 years after
Judge Brackenridge's opinion could well mean that the case at least
provoked thought and discussion among the members of the territorial
bar. After all, when two prominent attorneys come under the ban of a
court one would expect the others-prominent, aspiring, ambitious, or
just cautious-to take careful note.8
At first glance there seems to be little relation between the
substance of Brackenridge's opinion and the statute of 1828. The first
justified punishment for disrespectful commentary made at any time
and place, but the second allowed punishment only for remarks made
during the term of a court. This apparent lack of connection, however,
would probably vanish if one viewed the statute of 1828 as a compromise
solution to a perplexing problem. Presuming that Brackenridge's
action attracted the notice of the Florida bar and that the territory's
lawyers were aware of other contempt cases in America and England,
it is possible to see the 1828 Act as the outcome of a legal debate. The
American bar during this time seems not to have been divided on
the question of the contempt power and the summary process. Rather,
some members of the legal profession distinguished general attacks
on the courts from comments published while pertinent cases were
awaiting decision. Those making this distinction and upholding the
contempt power for the second type of attack argued that the first type
was harmless and could in no way be an improper influence on a
judge's work."
The statute of 1828 adopted this approach, possibly as a compromise
8. id.
9. This distinction is found most dramatically in the account of the trial of Judge
Peck of Missouri. Id. For instance, one of the prosecutors contended that the con-
tempt power
is indispensable to the due exercise of their [the judges'] high and important
functions, that they should have the power to protect themselves while engaged
in the administration of justice ....
. . . It must be a case of actual necessity, obvious to the common sense of
every impartial person. The administration of justice must be actually obstructed.
It will not do to rely upon a mere constructive interference, impeding the course
of justice, by some far-fetched implication.
Id. at 87. See also J. BIDDLE & W. MEREDITH, A STATEMENT 34-35 (1822).
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position, since some lawyers and judges no doubt supported Bracken-
ridge's action, while others (especially attorneys Fry and Steele) were
inclined to limit this discretionary power of the courts. The statute
permitted full discussion and criticism once the term of court was
done, but permitted punishment for indiscreet comment during term
time. Thus the statute did not prohibit attacks on the integrity and
dignity of the court, provided the attorneys and litigants held their
complaints and charges in reserve until the end of the term. By then,
presumably, few cases would still be pending, so the act, in effect,
granted the judge the power during term time to curtail and cite
those persons making comment he thought improper, prejudicial, or
plainly scandalous.
The Florida statute set a more definite standard than its counterpart
for the United States courts. At least as far as interpretation was con-
cerned, the Florida statute contained no such vague expressions as "so
near thereto" as appeared in the federal act,10 but instead established
the limit of term time within which courts could punish out-of-court
comment.
In the 1867 case of Ex parte Edwards," the Supreme Court of
Florida dealt for the first time with the problem of contempt. The
issue at hand was not one of contempt by out-of-court comment;
instead, the Edwards case concerned the authority of a court of equity
to punish disobedience to its orders. No one doubted, Chief Justice
DuPont said, that "in the absence of any statutory limitations or
restrictions, the power of the several courts over 'contempts' is omnipo-
tent, and its exercise is not to be enquired into by any other tribunal. ' '12
The power derived from English common law and was "the great bul-
wark established by the common law for the protection of courts of
justice, and for the maintainance [sic] of their dignity, authority and
efficiency . . . ."13 That is, the courts had full authority to determine
their contempt power in the absence of statutory limitation. "The
genius of our people, however, ever sensitively jealous of restraints
upon the personal liberty of the citizen, has caused them, through the
10. Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487.
11. 11 Fla. 174 (1867).
12. Id. at 186.
13. Id. The reference to common law was from Blackstone, who claimed that
summary punishment for contempt had been "immemorially used by the superior
courts of justice." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 0280. Recent scholarship, however,
has contended that Blackstone's claim rested more on an undelivered opinion by Mr.
Justice Wilmot than upon any rigorous study of the past. See J. Fox, THE HISTORY OF
CONTEMPr OF COURT (1972).
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action of the legislative department, to limit and restrict this common
law power of the courts. ' ' 14
The Supreme Court of Florida thus accepted the legislative pre-
rogative to define and circumscribe the contempt power. While Chief
Justice DuPont maintained that the power was inherent in English
and American courts, nowhere did he indicate the power was as
invulnerable as it was inherent. And in light of the times, perhaps
the Florida decision was all the more remarkable. With the unsettling
influence of the Civil War and the continuing uncertainties of Re-
construction, some judges might have used the situation to extend
their own power and prestige, were they so inclined. But, however
turbulent the times, dominant legal thought of the day still ran
counter to any sweeping assertion of judicial sovereignty over con-
tempts. Perhaps possession of considerable power to punish discouraged
acquisition of it all.15
The Edwards decision remained the law of the state through the
rest of the nineteenth century and into the second decade of the
twentieth. The intervening period witnessed the growing reluctance
of judges across the country to keep within the boundaries laid by
their respective legislatures. The spirit to wander was rife. In 1916
the Supreme Court of Florida followed suit in In re Hayes16 by citing
for contempt a reporter and the editor of a Florida newspaper for
articles which the justices found offensive. The court had to make a
decision on a contested gubernatorial election, and the published
comment was stinging and irritating. Mr. Justice Taylor noted the
solemnity of the occasion. "This is the first time in the history of
Florida that this court has issued a rule against the editor and reporter
of a newspaper to show cause why they should not be attached for con-
tempt .... "17 The court did not accuse the paper of improper comment
14. 11 Fla. at 186. DuPont saw that his duty lay in acknowledgment of the legis-
lative act, but he could have held his duty to be the defense of the sovereignty of
the courts.
15. By 1860, 23 of the 33 states had enacted limitations on the summary contempt
power. The state courts, as a rule, followed legislative sentiment and narrowly construed
their contempt power. Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication in the United States,
28 COLUM. L. REV. 525, 533 (1928). A major exception was an Arkansas decision in
1855, State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855), a portent of things to come. In a case
involving a published assault on the court's integrity, the court stated that a
legislative act restricting summary punishment was to be "regarded as nothing more
than the expression of a judicial opinion by the Legislature." Id. at 391.
16. 73 So. 362 (Fla. 1916). A summary of the change in legal attitudes in other
states is provided in Nelles & King, supra note 15, at 536.
17. 73 So. at 363. The opinion was actually per curiam, but the style of the writing
was Taylor's. See Brief for Amici Curiae at 48, Pennekamp v. State, 22 So. 2d 875 (Fla.
1945).
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on a pending case, but pointed instead to "a libelous article impugning
the integrity, dignity, and authority of this court."' s
Justice Taylor found the published attacks incomprehensible, for
how could one explain unjustified assaults on a venerable institution?
It is to be hoped that the good sense of our people, their love of
order and respect for the institutions of our government, will
operate to restrain the impulsive and ill-natured words of those
among us who seem to be so alert to suspect and ready to condemn
and that proceedings of this nature may not become necessary in
the future to restrain the vicious tendencies of those who traffic in
scandal and sensation and which lead them to attacks upon the
integrity and authority of our institutions.19
So when public opinion failed to check the mischievous editors, the
courts had an obligation to act to fill the void. When Taylor claimed
that the scandalous accusations were "an insult to the people whose
agents the courts are," the logic echoed the decision of State v.
Morrill,20 from Arkansas some 61 years before. By ridiculing the courts
and by attributing base motives to the judges, the editor was a renegade
in his own society. "The author and distributor of such publications,
therefore, is an enemy to his people, a veritable traitor to his govern-
ment whose protection he enjoys." 21
United with the people and the courts in the effort to secure a
free society, Taylor continued, the press had its duties to perform.
"'The court looks to the sober judgment of all reflecting and in-
telligent men, and to none with more confidence than the enlightened
and liberal conductors of the press, who, as before remarked, have
generally manifested a disposition to maintain public respect for
the judicial tribunals of the country.' "22 As long as high standards
were maintained, neither the courts nor the people had cause to
fear "the true journalist," for both the courts and the people "are
safely guarded by them in the field of their labors. ' ' 23 And in its proper
role the press had little to fear from the courts. "It may be said to
the credit of the press in this state that, except in very few instances,
it has upheld and maintained respect for the judiciary."2 4 Only when
18. 73 So. at 363.
19. Id.
20. 16 Ark. 384 (1855). See note 15 supra. The quoted remark by Justice Taylor
appears at 73 So. at 363.
21. 73 So. at 363.
22. Id. The words came from Chief Justice English's opinion in State v. Morrill,
16 Ark. 384, 411 (1855).
23. 73 So. at 364.
24. Id.
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the "true journalist" degenerated into the "pseudo-journalist" would
the people "expect and receive injury and insult." 25 Pseudo-journalism
fell under the scourge of the courts, for the right of free press and the
right to discuss judicial proceedings did not "include the right to
attempt, by wanton defamation, groundless charges of unfairness and
stubborn partisanship to degrade the tribunal and impair its
efficiency." 26
The basis of the authority to curb such pseudo-journalism was not,
however, derived from the statute. While the limiting act of 1828
permitted the punishment of scandalous remarks made during term
time, the court chose instead to cross the judicial Rubicon. The
judges looked away from their state's legal history and ruled that the
Florida contempt power existed independent of statutory grant.
Curiously, the justices did not go quite as far as their brethren in
other states, for they did not erect an impregnable judicial fortress
against all legislative attempts to limit the contempt power. The
reason was clear: to punish the out-of-court criticism the Florida
justices did not have to leap a statutory hurdle built years before.
Since the Florida statute did not exclude publications from judicial
censure, provided they appeared during a term of court, the court
had no occasion to repudiate legislative limitations on the contempt
power; it only declared its power inherent, "independent of statutory
authority. ' ' 27 The justices possibly realized that "[a] grant of power
to a court is tempting but the acknowledgment of it presupposes the
authority to withdraw same." 28 The founding of the contempt power
outside the legislative grant was in a sense a clearing of the court's
flanks, securing territory for possible expansion if the jurists of a later
day saw fit. Had the circumstances of the Hayes contempt been
different, had the newspaper jibed the justices during vacation, the
Florida Supreme Court might well have taken another step, proclaim-
ing a judicially sovereign contempt power, a la Morrill.
With the Hayes decision, the Florida courts now had a rationale
for punishing obnoxious critics. The standard was essentially that
applied by the Arkansas Supreme Court in the Morrill case: scandalizing
25. Id.
26. Id. at 366. The judges had reason to worry about respect for the law. "Lawless-
ness was general. . . .The violence of the Civil War and Reconstruction Period con-
tributed heavily to a lack of respect for society's laws. . . Men . . . came home to
find state and local governments ineffectively administered at a time when law enforce-
ment was especially needed. Distrusting authorities, Southerners in many places became
their own family defenders." T. CLARK, THE SOUTHERN COUNTRY EDrroR 216 (1948).
27. 73 So. at 365.
28. State ex tel. Franks v. Clark, 46 So. 2d 488, 489 (Fla. 1950).
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or impugning the integrity of the court.2 9 The years following the
Hayes ruling saw the first decision by the United States Supreme
Court ruling squarely on the issue of contempt by publication. In
Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,30 Chief Justice White used
a "reasonable tendency" test for judging whether certain out-of-court
statements were contemptuous. The Chief Justice drew the line be-
tween permissible and impermissible speech at the point where the
words reasonably tended to obstruct the administration of justice by
unduly influencing or embarrassing the judge. Discretion remained
with the trial judge in determining the tendency of any spoken or
published statements brought into question. On the surface, however,
the federal standard excluded from the scope of the contempt power
remarks which were scandalous but which lacked the tendency to
obstruct. While the Toledo "reasonable tendency" rule still permitted
judges to punish unflattering commentary on the courts, it at least
directed the attention of the federal courts to the process and ad-
ministration of justice, rather than to the sensitive judicial ego.
In two related cases in 1923, the Supreme Court of Florida in-
corporated White's reasonable tendency test into state law.3 1 Judge
Davis of the circuit court in West Palm Beach was anxiously trying
to secure appointment as a federal district judge. At the same time,
Judge Earman of the West Palm Beach municipal court reportedly
told friends that he would personally see that Davis did not receive the
judgeship. Active opposition to Davis's advancement also came from
Mayor Biggers of West Palm Beach.
While Judge Earman and Mayor Biggers were engaged in their
surreptitious efforts, the former's court convicted one Edwin Antelo
of "lewd and lascivious conduct.' ' 32 Antelo promptly filed a petition
for habeas corpus with Judge Davis of the circuit court, who released
29. With this test the discretion to cite lay with the judge:
We must, I think, leave the right to try the facts summarily in the hands of
the trial court. We can look with but little hope to any plan for controlling
bad judges of these trial courts from the outside or through provisions for appeal.
What we need is wise statesmanship, even when it is exercised by judges. We
may talk as much as we please about the admirable thesis that we have a govern-
ment of laws and not of men. But probably John Adams himself at the very
moment when he put the period to that famous sentence would have remained
consistent to his own character and course of life and would have agreed that
in matters of conduct and of expediency, like these contempt troubles, laws
are a brittle shield and our reliance must be on real "two-legged" men.
Hale, Public Opinion As Contempt of Court, 58 AM. L. Rav. 481, 498-99 (1924).
30. 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
31. Ex parte Earman, 95 So. 755 (Fla. 1923); Ex parte Biggers, 95 So. 763 (Fla.
1923).
32. 95 So. at 756.
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Antelo on a nominal bond pending a hearing on the petition. Judge
Earman of the municipal court wrote a letter to Davis, explaining
that "[t]he police department of West Palm Beach was very active
last week, with the result that many cases under the charge of lewd
and lascivious conduct were presented for trial."33 Earman stated that,
pending Davis's decision in the Antelo case, he had released all the
other persons similarly charged on a nominal bond before pronouncing
judgment. Earman noted in his letter that many "influential friends"
had aided Antelo in his habeas corpus action and said that he was
temporarily releasing the others as a matter of "fairness.
'
"
34
Judge Davis accepted the letter from his political enemy as a piece
of judicial chicanery. Not only was the letter "a reflection upon the
court," but Earman supposedly wrote the words "for the purpose of
embarrassing" the judge and "influencing him in the disposition of
said case." 35 For the circuit judge, no doubt remained that Earman
"intended to charge that the court was induced to grant the writ of
habeas corpus . . . by the influence and wealth of Antelo and his
friends, and by implication to charge that the court was by these
corrupt influences induced to grant said writ of habeas corpus." 36 The
fact that Judge Earman had shown his letter to several people prior
to mailing did not in the least soothe Judge Davis's feelings.
Just before Davis released Antelo on the writ of habeas corpus,
Mayor Biggers noted the incident in a speech to the Florida League
of Municipalities on February 1, 1923. The Miami Daily Metropolis
quoted the West Palm Beach mayor as saying, "We have a circuit
judge who is weak as water." He also said that, "Our court is absolutely
annulled if a man has money and influence. "
3 7
Judge Earman's letter and Mayor Biggers' statement struck Judge
Davis not only as embarrassments but also as impediments to justice in
pending cases. The coincidence was that by protecting the streams
of justice from pollution, he was at the same time punishing two persons
who were doing their best to keep him off the federal bench.38
33. Id.
34. Id. at 756-57.
35. Id. at 757.
36. Id.
37. 95 So. at 765.
38. For Thomas Jefferson, at any rate, misbehavior in public office was more than
a possibility; it was a probability.
[I]t would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the men of our choice
to silence our fears for the safety of our rights; that confidence is every where
the parent of despotism; free government is founded in jealousy, and not in
confidence; it is jealousy, and not confidence, which prescribes limited constitu-
tions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust with power.....
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On appeal from the contempt convictions, Justice Whitfield wrote
a separate opinion for each of the two cases. In the Earman opinion,
the Florida Supreme Court echoed the sentiments of the Hayes de-
cision:
Respect for courts and judicial officers in the performance of
their judicial functions or in matters that are incident to administer-
ing right and justice, naturally arises in the human mind from
an appreciation of the delicacy and importance of the power
exercised by courts and judges and by the becoming manner in
which the functions are performed by those intrusted with the
power.
But, as all persons do not at all times appreciate or recognize
their obligations of respect for the tribunals that are established by
governmental authority, to maintain right and justice in the various
relations of human life, the courts and judges have, under consti-
tutional government, inherent power by due course of law to ap-
propriately punish by fine or imprisonment or otherwise, any con-
duct that in law constitutes an offense against the authority and
dignity of a court or judicial officer in the performance of judicial
functions3 9
But Whitfield, as if to warn that a judge who made free use of his
contempt power would soon experience diminishing returns on his
popularity and integrity, also noted that the behavior of judges could
affect the degree of respect the people exhibited for their institutions.40
Having restated the inherent nature of the contempt power which
Hayes made plain-though still without declaring the power immune
to legislative restriction-Justice Whitfield proceeded to apply White's
reasonable tendency standard. "The criterion is not the influence the
conduct or acts complained of may have had upon the mind of the
particular judge, but the true test is the reasonable tendency of the
conduct or the acts done to improperly influence or to embarrass or
hamper the judicial action of a court."4 1
In questions of power, then, let no more be said of confidence in man, but
bind him down from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.
4 J. ELUioTr, DEBATES 543 (1941).
39. 95 So. at 760.
40. A statement by de Tocqueville seems relevant here. "Men are not corrupted
by the exercise of a power or debased by the habit of obedience: but by the exercise
of a power, which they believe to be illegal and by obedience to a rule, which they
consider to be usurped and oppressive." Quoted in J. THOMAS, supra note 1, at 3.
41. 95 So. at 761.
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Whitfield next examined the facts at hand to determine whether
the trial judge erred in finding Judge Earman in contempt.
In this case it does not appear that the circuit judge was ac-
tually engaged in hearing or considering the case referred to in
the proceedings; but it is clear that, though the letter was received
by the judge, the other acts complained of were not done in the
presence of the judge or so near as to interrupt judicial proceedings,
and it is also clear that the letter and the acts complained of could
not reasonably have tended to embarrass the judge in his judicial
functions.42
Judge Davis's contempt action against Mayor Biggers fared no
better before the supreme court, and Justice Whitfield offered a
second opinion, expressing views similar to those in Earman. The
court noted that the mayor's remarks appeared in a newspaper in
another city, "though, by reasonable inference, the speech complained
of and its publication, as set out in the statement, were intended to
be, and were, personally offensive to the judge to whom the statements
referred . . . ."4 While the mayor's comment was "an unjustifiable
personal affront," the remark, "in view of the assumed character and
fortitude of a circuit judge," could have had "no real tendency to
embarrass the court in determining the cause referred to, or to interfere
with and hinder and embarrass the court in arriving at a decision and
final order in said cause. ' ' 44 Even if the mayor's speech had influenced
Judge Davis, the mayor was not in contempt. What he said lacked the
reasonable tendency to influence, given the qualities a circuit judge
should possess. Thus the reasonable tendency test could work against
contempt convictions as well as for them. Remarks that might disturb
a sensitive judge should not be of concern to the "average" judge.45
In his opinion Justice Whitfield attempted to erase scandalizing
the court as a basis for contempt in Florida.
The right to make fair comments and criticisms of official con-
duct, does not warrant or excuse offensive statements reflecting
upon officials as such; but, unless acts or words of criticism or con-
demnation affecting a judicial officer, not perpetrated in or near his
presence, when acting judicially, are of such a nature and occur
under such circumstances as to offend the court as such or to
hinder or embarrass the orderly discharge of judicial functions, such
42. Id.
43. Id. at 769.
44. id.
45. Id.
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acts, words, or other conduct do not in general warrant imprisonment
as for contempt of court.46
Repeating an idea of Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme
Court, Whitfield added that
[a] circuit judge is expected to be a man of ordinary firmness of
character; and, if the matter complained of as constituting contempt,
when fairly interpreted, does not have a reasonable tendency to de-
grade or to embarrass or hinder such a judge in performing his own
duty, or to affect a mind of reasonable fortitude, it is not a criminal
contempt for which imprisonment may be lawfully adjudicated,
particularly when an intent to offend is denied on oath.4
7
Justice Whitfield in the Earman and Biggers opinions forgot the
reference point of the Florida contempt statute and applied instead
a standard used by the United States Supreme Court in Toledo some
6 years earlier. The Florida court modified the Hayes ruling by ex-
cluding from punishment purely scandalous comment which did not
tend to influence a judge. In so doing, the court was building the
law of contempt on a basis independent of statutory authority, for
the justices reaffirmed the inherent nature of the contempt power as
stated in Hayes. It was the broad purview of the Hayes decision,
covering comment not tending to pressure the judiciary, which the
Earman and Biggers decisions of 1923 attempted to narrow.
. Justice Whitfield, like Chief Justice White before him, avoided
explaining the method for determining reasonable tendency. Too often
the words could mean all tests to all judges, and a judge eager to
punish an insult to his court would probably act accordingly, employing
the fashionable test of the era, unless the alleged contempt was so far-
fetched as to be sure of reversal on appeal. Apparently the reasonable
tendency test presumed a judge blessed with an average degree of those
good qualities which judges were supposed to possess. In any given
situation the judge was required to imagine the outcome if the
questioned act or speech were allowed to continue. If the act or
speech seemed to lead toward an obstruction or hindrance of the court's
work, then the reasonable tendency test was satisfied.
But, given the lack of omniscient powers in human minds, the
process of speculation, prediction, and estimation was a dubious one at
any time. The rational application of the test was even more unlikely
46. Id.
47. Id. The phrase "firmness of character" came from Holmes' dissent in Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 424 (1918).
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when the remarks offended the judge personally and called into ques-
tion his integrity and fitness to wear the robe. In such a situation, a
wounded judge could easily reason that any criticism he felt unjust
tended to impede justice, for if the barrage of scandal persisted, the
people would surely lose all faith in his court. At this point the
reasonable tendency test blended with the broader integrity rule, and
with the judge's concern for his professional neck.
The Earman and Biggers decisions were significant for their attempt
to limit the scope of contempt in Florida, and represented the Florida
law of contempt until the fourth decade of this century. On at least
two other occasions the supreme court reaffirmed these rulings, defining
out-of-court contempts in terms of the reasonable tendency test.48
During this period courts across the land started to question previously
held positions, and many legal commentators were calling for a more
limited scope of contempt of court.49 The Florida standard was a
narrow one when compared to that prevailing in many other states,
and so the gradual broadening of the Florida contempt power after
1930 was a curious contrast to the trend in other jurisdictions. The
first real indication of the return of the Florida rule to the level
of the Hayes decision of 1916 was Cormack v. Coleman5° in 1935.
Judge Jefferson B. Browne, former chief justice of the Florida Su-
preme Court, was sitting for the criminal court of Dade County.
Cormack, a reporter for the Miami Beach Daily Tribune, wrote a
lively article which was published in that paper.
Judge Jefferson B. Browne, former Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court, was ordered to the Lewis trial by Gov. Dave Sholtz
and at first he saw nothing wrong with Pine's prosecuting his
friends [Fred Pine was the county solicitor].
It was Judge Browne who presided at the trial of Pine himself
a few years ago when the County Solicitor was 'vindicated' on
charges of improperly performing the duties of his office in connec-
tion with the slot machine scandal that brought about the suicide
of former Sheriff Lehman. 5'
But the reporter erred, confusing Browne with a Judge Brown who
48. Wilson v. Joughin, 141 So. 182 (Fla. 1932); Baumgartner v. Joughin, 141 So.
185 (Fla. 1932).
49. See, e.g., Address by Judge Emory Niles, Maryland State Bar Ass'n Annual
Meeting, June 28, 1940, in REPORT OF THE FORTY-FIFrH ANNUAL MEETING AND MID-
WINTER SESSION OF THE MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N 101 (1940). Niles at the time was
Associate Judge of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City.
50. 161 So. 844 (Fla. 1935).
51. Id. at 845.
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had actually presided at the earlier trial. So, on the following day,
the Tribune published an apology.
The Tribune inadvertently made a misstatement yesterday to the
effect that Judge Jefferson D. Browne, who presided in the trial of
Hayes Lewis, had also presided over the trial of Fred Pine in connec-
tion with the slot machine scandals which resulted in the suicide of
the late Sheriff Lehman. It was Judge W. F. Brown who presided
at one of the Pine trials and Judge Vining Harris who presided
over the trial which resulted in the acquittal of Pine.
52
Honest mistake or not, Judge Browne was offended and held the
reporter in contempt of court for failure to display proper respect
for the tribunal.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, Justice Whitfield, for
the court, accepted the findings of his former colleague. "Such admitted
published words are not ambiguous and are necessarily contemptuous
of the court and its processes." 5 3 In addition, the printed apology did
not mitigate the harm which the misrepresentation had caused.
Whitfield's brief opinion met sharp dissent from Justice Buford. "I
am unable to agree ... that the acts set forth in the petition for citation
for contempt which are alleged to have been acts of contempt of court
are sufficient to constitute contempt. ' ' 54 Buford did not intend to deny
the existence of the contempt power, and noted "that there is a limit
to the freedom which may be exercised by the press in unwarranted
criticisms of judges and of the courts ... ."55 But to preserve respect,
"the courts must not fall in the error of arbitrarily adjudging acts to
have been perpetrated in contempt of court when there is no basis in
fact for such adjudication. ' ' 56 According to Buford, the published error
could have had no harmful effect on Judge Browne's court.
The Cormack case was significant not because of any new concept
of contempt contained within the opinion, but because the decision
was a swing toward a broader purview for contempt, reminiscent of
the Hayes ruling of 1916. Explanation for the reorientation would be
difficult to establish. Other states during the 1930's were making efforts
to narrow the scope of the contempt power, but the experience in
Florida indicated a move in the opposite direction. That Judge Browne
was a former member of the supreme tribunal no doubt gave credence
52. Id. at 846.
53. Id. at 849.
54. Id. at 850.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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to his citation for contempt, and perhaps the supreme court was simply
hesitant to overrule a former chief justice. This possibility received
further support from the fact that Whitfield's opinion was very short
and avoided any real discussion of applicable contempt law. Whitfield
himself had written the opinions in the Earman and Biggers cases of
1923, and the remarks in those earlier cases probably represented a
greater threat to the court concerned than the newspaper's error about
Judge Browne. Given the short opinion and Whitfield's previously
stated views, one could suggest that the supreme court stretched the
legal rule to cover the action of a former colleague and leader. Perhaps
only Cormack and his paper objected to such benevolence at the time,
but the decision became a precedent, and a precedent could return
to haunt in a way its creators never dreamed.
Before the Florida Supreme Court had the chance to expand or
contract Cormack, the United States Supreme Court changed the
variables. First, in Nye v. United States, 57 the Court overturned the
Toledo ruling by confining federal contempts to acts geographically
near the courtroom. Then in Bridges v. California,5s the Court applied
the clear and present danger standard of free speech to state contempt
proceedings. "[W]e cannot allow the mere existence of... untested state
decisions to destroy the historic constitutional meaning of freedom of
speech and of the press." 59
To some the Nye and Bridges decisions effectively concluded the
chapter on contempt by publication. But these commentators forgot
that for decisional law to become law in fact, courts must apply the
rulings of the supreme federal bench, and often these courts are
state courts. In fact, a Florida construction of the Bridges case led to
the second controversy involving a state ruling on out-of-court con-
tempt to reach the Supreme Court of the United States within a
decade. Pennekamp v. State6° was without a doubt the most celebrated
and lively out-of-court contempt case to occur in Florida, for the case
brought together intriguing and appealing circumstances, personalities,
and debates. On one side was The Miami Herald, one of the state's
major newspapers, and its associate editor John D. Pennekamp. On the
other side was the Dade County Circuit Court, represented by Judges
Marshall C. Wiseheart and Paul D. Barns.
Three criminal cases in Miami during 1944 sparked the affair.
In the first, Judge Paul D. Barns on October 30 quashed eight indict-
57. 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
58. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
59. Id. at 268.
60. 22 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
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ments for rape because they failed to designate the victim. The record
was vague as to whether the prosecutor agreed that the court should
have quashed all the indictments. The court, however, arranged for
immediate reindictments.
In the second case, vice and other illegal activities at the Brook
Club were at issue. On March 22, 1944, the state attorney procured
from Judge Holt a temporary restraining order against the club to
halt suspected illegal operations. On August 14, the club filed a motion
for review of the order, and on October 24, the court notified the
state attorney of the hearing on the motion set for October 31. At
the appointed time the state attorney was working with the grand
jury, and since no one was present to move for continuance of the
order or postponement of the hearing, Judge Wiseheart dismissed the
case and revoked the order.
In the third case, Judge Holt questioned the validity of the state's
affidavits which formed the primary evidence in a suit to enjoin
bookmaking at the Tepee Club. On October 12, Judge Holt reminded
the state attorney that "you can prove anything by an affidavit," '61 and
denied the state's request for a temporary injunction against the club.
The Miami Herald considered the disposition in each case a varia-
tion on a milk-toast theme. The newspaper had been concerned for
a long time about lax law enforcement in Miami and Dade County.
Much of the notorious Chicago gangster element had settled in the
Miami area following the repeal of prohibition, and several of the
more successful gangsters operated large gambling empires in the
tourist-rich section of southern Florida. Whether true in fact, many
citizens of Miami believed that the "gambling interests" had sufficient
control of the police and the courts in Dade County to avoid serious
prosecution. Attorneys, policemen, and judges not in the "service" of
the underworld elements became dismayed at the ease with which
persons accused of gambling and other vices secured outright acquittals
or reduced sentences in courtrooms where "bought" judges and defense
attorneys were receiving more money in fees for a single case than
the "honest" legal servants earned in an entire year. 2
Perhaps indicative of the temper of the community's "respectable"
citizens was the Report of the Dade County Grand Jury of May 15,
1944.3 The grand jurors were generally critical of police and prose-
61. Record at 137, Pennekamp v. State, 22 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1945) [hereinafter cited
as Record].
62. Interview with John D. Pennekamp, Editor of The Miami Herald, in Miami,
Florida, March 10, 1967.
63. The report is contained in the Record at 43-81.
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cutors for allowing illegal gambling operations in Miami and Miami
Beach to continue and to flourish. "The very existence of an organized
racket means political connivance with it. Obviously, no politician is
going to connive-at least for long-unless the gamblers will finance
his campaign and make his political life agreeable and pleasant, and
even profitable, in return for his 'liberality.' ",6
Whatever the uncertainties and confusion of the rape and club
cases, The Miami Herald reported on November 1 that the grand
jury had reindicted those previously charged with rape. On the same
day, however, the newspaper posted editorial comment which was a
foretaste of words to come.
It's the law. The layman will have to let it go at that, even
though he does not quite grasp why an indictment charging eight
defendants with rape must be thrown out because of a tech-
nicality and the grand jury compelled to go through the in-
dicting process again so that they can be brought to trial.
Some day the American people are going to see to it that the
courts can make needed corrections, cross the "t's" and dot the "i's"
which now are a fetish of our jurisprudence.65
Unhappy with community crime, the newspaper was impatient with
the procedural rules of law and was hardly appreciative of their
application to despicable sorts of people. Moreover, so overriding was
the Herald's concern that the author of the editorial was indifferent
to the omission from the first indictment of the name of the person
who was raped.
The Herald published another editorial on November 2, noting
the handling of the rape and club cases as a barometer of the law
enforcement problem which the community faced.
The courts belong to the people. The people have established
them to promote justice, insure obedience to the law and to punish
those who willfully violate it.
The people maintain the courts by providing the salaries of
officials and setting up costly chambers and courtrooms for the
orderly and dignified procedure of the tribunals.
Upon the judges the people must depend for the decisions and
the judicial conduct that will insure society-as a whole and in its
individuals-against those who would undermine or destroy the
peace, the morality and the orderly living of the community.
64. Record at 71.
65. The Miami Herald, Nov. 1, 1944, at 6-A, col. 1.
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This week the people, through their grand jury, brought into
court eight indictments for rape. Judge Paul D. Barns agreed with
the defense that the indictments were not properly drawn. Back
they went to the grand jury for re-presentation to the court.
Only in the gravest emergency does a judge take over a case
from another court of equal jurisdiction. A padlock action against
the Brook Club was initiated last spring before Judge George E.
Holt, who granted a temporary injunction.
After five months, the case appeared Tuesday out of blue
sky before Judge Marshall C. Wiseheart at the time State Attorney
Stanley Milledge was engaged with the grand jury.
Speedy decision was asked by defense counsel despite months of
stalling. The State Attorney had to choose between the grand jury
and Judge Wiseheart's court.
The judge dismissed the injunction against the club and its
operators. The defense got delay when it wanted and prompt de-
cision from the court when it profited it.
On Oct. 10 Judge Holt had before him a suit by the state to
abate a nuisance (bookmaking) at the Tepee Club.
Five affidavits of persons who allegedly visited the premises for
the purpose of placing bets were introduced by the state over the
objection of the defendants.
Judge Holt ruled them out ....
If technicalities are to be the order and the way for the criminally
charged either to avoid justice altogether or so to delay prosecution
as to cripple it, then it behooves our courts and the legal profession
to cut away the deadwood and the entanglements.
Make it possible for the state's case, the people's case, to be seen
with equal clarity of judicial vision as that accorded accused law-
breakers. Otherwise technicalities and the courts make the law, no
matter what the will of the people and of their legislators.66
The same issue of the Herald also contained a cartoon on the
editorial page. The interpretation of the cartoon would depend on one's
view of the Herald campaign and of the procedure followed by the
Dade County officials in the three cases. Briefly, the cartoon showed
a judge on the bench, labeled "the law," presenting to a man a paper
marked "defendant dismissed." At the judge's right was a short man,
identified as "public interest," saying, "But, Judgel" ' 7
After this major journalistic assault on November 2, a secondary
attack followed on November 7, in the form of a brief editorial.
66. The Miami Herald, Nov. 2, 1944, at 6-A, col. 2.
67. Id. cols. 3, 4.
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Here is an example of why people wonder about the law's delays
and obstructing technicalities operating to the disadvantage of the
state-which is the people-in prosecutions.
After stalling along for months, the defense in the padlock case
against the Brook Club appeared before Judge Marshall C. Wise-
heart for a decision. The State Attorney was working with the grand
jury. The court knocked out the injunction. There was speed,
dispatch, immediate attention and action for those charged with
violation of the law. So fast that the people didn't get in a peep.68
Judges Barns and Wiseheart found the published editorials too
scandalous to disregard, and cited John D. Pennekamp and the Herald
for contempt on November 10. To the readers of the Herald during
the fall of 1944, the contempt charge was neither unexpected nor
surprising. The cumulative effect of the editorials and cartoon tended
"to create a distrust for said court and the judges thereof in the
minds of the people of this county and state." 69 With reference to the
three cases which had sparked the explosion, the published matter
tended "to prevent and prejudice a fair and impartial action of the
said Court and the Judges thereof in respect to the said pending
cases."
70
As far as Wiseheart and Barns were concerned, the thorn in the
flesh was the inaccurate reporting of the cases involved and the
charges of corruption which the published accounts seemed to imply.
In a county where political chicanery and the buying and selling of
justice were hardly unknown, these elected judges felt that to remain
silent would signify guilt.
The judges claimed that the editorial of November 2 failed to
report the reindictment of the alleged rapists, saying only that Judge
Barns "agreed with the defense attorney that the indictments were
not properly drawn." As for the Brook Club proceeding, the case did
not appear "out of blue sky," but had been languishing for some 90
days because the state attorney had taken no action. The judges
also felt the first editorial charged dishonesty in the Tepee Club
affair, rather than sincere devotion to duty. Taken together, the
editorials and cartoon
have thereby represented unto the general public that notwith-
standing the great public trust vested in the Judges of this Court
that they have not discharged their duties honorably and fairly in
68. The Miami Herald, Nov. 7, 1944, at 6-A, col. 1.
69. Record at 5.
70. Id.
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respect to said pending cases as hereinbefore set forth, all of which
tends to obstruct and interfere with the said Judges as such in
fairly and impartially administering justice and in the discharging
of their duties in conformity with the true principles which you
have so properly recognized in the forepart of said editorial above
quoted as being incumbent upon them and each of them. 71
But if the judges' contention of false accusation had basis in fact,
their notion of "pending" cases lacked such solid foundation. The
Brook Club and Tepee Club cases were pending on November 2
only in the sense that the state might take further action. True, the
rulings were open for modification or rehearing, but the judges made
believe that the newspaper comment came at a time when they were
pondering weighty questions of law prior to deciding the cases at
hand. This contention simply did not correspond with the facts.
According to the notion of pendency advanced by Barns and Wise-
heart, a newspaper could poison the fountain of justice even before
it began to flow.72
The judgment for contempt did not come until December 18,
but Judge Barns was still smarting from the pain well over a month
after the burn. "The public depend [sic] upon newspapers for informa-
tion and the public has a right to assume that a newspaper will fairly
report the proceedings of the courts-the people's own institutions.
Correct information will remedy evils but misinformation and regi-
mented news may likely destroy the good." 73 The judge spoke of the
power of a major newspaper to work for the good or ill of the com-
munity.74 "The public has come to depend upon reputable news-
papers for information and a false report by a reputable newspaper is
accepted as true and the people are deceived."75 While the judges might
have overlooked incorrect and scandalous reports appearing in a weekly
publication of small and scattered circulation, they could not remain
silent about editorials in the Herald, the daily circulation of which
peaked 125,000. "With increased circulation comes greater responsi-
bilities. ' ' 76 The Herald had violated the people's right not to be "mis-
71. Id. at 72.
72. Id. at 193-201.
73. Id. at 216.
74. Giles Patterson, who entered amicus curiae on behalf of the state when the
Pennekamp case was before the Supreme Court of Florida, had written 6 years earlier:
"The press . . . should realize that its power and opportunity to create sentiment which
may affect the trial of individual rights require it to recognize that the social claim
of the courts is at least equal to the right of the press." G. PATrERSON, FREE SPEECH AND A
FmE Pmrss 152 (1939).
75. Record at 216-17.
76. Id. at 217.
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informed and deceived concerning their courts. Courts are for the
people, and they, the people, are entitled to a fair report concerning
court actions. " 77 Finally, Judge Barns sounded a sober warning to all
local commentators on the courts. "To report on court proceedings
is a voluntary undertaking but when undertaken the publisher who
fails to fairly report does so at his own peril. ' '7 To enter the sanctum
sanctorum was a privilege, and to give false reports of what one found
there was sacrilege against the holy name of justice.
Five of the seven justices of the Supreme Court of Florida agreed
substantially with the circuit judges from Dade County. If only for
reasons of fraternalism, the justices sympathized with their brethren
on the trial bench for the scathing criticism to which the Herald had
subjected them. Speaking for the five, Justice Terrell set the tone of
the opinion when he pointedly declared, "[I]t is utter folly to suggest
that the object of these publications was other than to abase and
destroy the efficiency of the court." 79
The record simply did not substantiate the newspaper's charges,
revealing not "a breath of suspicion on which to predicate partisanship
and unfairness on the part of the judges.""" On the contrary, "they acted
in good faith and handled each case to the very best advantage
possible."81 Had the supreme court justices themselves heard the three
cases at issue, "[t]here was no judgment that could have been entered
in any of them except the one that was entered."8 2 The contempt re-
sulted not from honest criticism, but from perverse suggestions.
If the editorials had stated the facts correctly, nothing but a correct
conclusion could have been deduced and there would have been
no basis for contempt but here they elected to publish as truth a
mixture of factual misstatement and omission and impose on that
false insinuation, distortion, and deception and then contend that
freedom of the press immunizes them from punishment.8 3
Faced with these circumstances, what law were the justices to
apply? The Hayes decision from 1916 appealed to them, but the
Bridges decision by the United States Supreme Court presented a
formidable obstacle. Rather than tackle the obstacle, the Florida court
dodged it altogether. "The Hayes case is the best reasoned case we
77. Id.
78. Id. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 96 S. Ct. 958 (1976).
79. Pennekamp v. State, 22 So. 2d 875, 883 (Fla. 1945).
80. Id. at 882.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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have found on the subject and is supported by the current of state
and Federal decisions throughout the country.
'
"
8 4
Counsel for Pennekamp and the Herald argued that Bridges re-
quired the existence of a clear and present danger to the administra-
tion of justice before a judge could cite for contempt. But the court
was unimpressed by this contention. Only since 1925 had "anyone
dreamed that the Federal Constitution had anything to do with the
punishment for contempt under state law. ' 8 5 The reason was apparent,
for "[t]he States had been exercising the power to punish for con-
tempt for more than a hundred years ... ."86 As for the 1941 Bridges
decision, "we find nothing in the . . . case indicating a purpose to
supersede state law and decisions on the question or to require state
courts to conform to Federal pattern. ' ' 7 If the Bridges decision
established a rule, the Florida justices thought it very narrow. "[G]iven
its broadest scope, we cannot say that the Bridges case did more than
decide the law of that case. We think the rule still persists that each
case must stand or fall by the facts presented." 8
Although Pennekamp's counsel insisted that the Bridges decision
applied first amendment standards to state contempt cases, the Florida
justices remained unmoved. Terrell's opinion recognized that the
fourteenth amendment indeed brought certain standards to bear on
state governments, but these were not necessarily those of the first
amendment. In fact, the only condition imposed by the fourteenth
amendment on the states was "the observance of due process. ' 89 That
is, "the judgment . . . must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or dis-
criminatory."" Thus the Florida court simply ruled that the national
free speech standard did not apply to the states, without meeting head-
on the argument that the Herald's contempt citation violated free
speech. Terrell added that even if the clear and present danger test
84. Id. at 881.
85. Id. at 883. Terrell's remark about the year 1925 refers to Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), in which the Supreme Court assumed that the first amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech was among the fundamental personal liberties protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment from abridgment by the states.
86. 22 So. 2d at 883.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 884. "Although the language of the Bridges case is broad enough to apply
to any charge of contempt by publication regardless of the presence of a statute, the
Florida court took the position that in view of the established history of the law in
such cases it was not the intention of the Supreme Court to apply the rule so broadly."
Note, "The Clear and Present Danger" Rule and Contempt by Publication, 41 ILL. L.
REv. 690, 691 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
89. 22 So. 2d at 884.
90. Id.
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were applicable, federal review should confine itself to whether the
states had applied the test fairly.91
Without the first amendment rule, the state courts were free to
rely on state guarantees of free expression. And what was the Florida
rule applicable to newspaper comment on courts? "A newspaper may
criticize, harass, irritate, or vent its spleen against a person who holds
the office of judge in the same manner that it does a member of the
Legislature and other elective officers, but it may not publish scurrilous
or libelous criticisms of a presiding judge as such or his judgments
for the purpose of discrediting the Court in the eyes of the public."92
Terrell readily affirmed the principle that "[r]espect for courts
is not inspired by shielding them from criticism." 93 Instead, respect
was "a responsibility of the judge, acquired over the years by the
spirit in which he approaches the judicial process, his ability to
humanize the law and square it with reason, the level of his thinking,
the consistency of his adherence to right and justice, and the degree
to which he holds himself aloof from blocs, groups, and techniques
that would sacrifice justice for expediency." 94 On the other hand,
while the judge must win respect for himself by devotion to duty, he
had every right to protect his hard-earned position from scandalous
attacks from the wings. For while the judge was always open to
criticism from the press, the latter was hardly immune to a bark or a
bite from the former.95
Lest he appear opposed to a free press, Terrell offered a rationale
for the constitutional status which newspapers enjoyed. "Our fore-
fathers were committed to the doctrine that democratic processes
could not survive, absent a public opinion energized by truth, liberty,
equality, and justice. Hence the reason for a free and untrammeled
press as a medium to generate such a type of public opinion." 96 With
91. Id. at 886.
92. Id. at 884.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 884-85.
95. As to the efficacy of leaving newspapers to correct their own abuses, Justice
Terrell might have had in mind a statement by H. L. Mencken:
Journalistic codes of ethics are all moonshine. Essentially, they are absurd as
would be codes of street-car conductors, barbers or public jobholders. If American
journalism is to be purged of its present swinishness and brought up to a decent
level of repute-and God knows that such an improvement is needed-it must
be accomplished by the devices of morals, not by those of honor. That is to
say, it must be accomplished by external forces, and through the medium of
penalties, exteriorly inflicted.
As quoted in Note, "The Clear and Present Danger" Rule and Contempt by Publica-
tion, 41 ILL. L. REV. 690, 695 n.37 (1947), quoting The Daily Record (Baltimore) March
11, 1932, at 3, col. 1, 4.
96. 22 So. 2d at 885.
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the bait, however, came the hook. "It therefore follows that while the
Bill of Rights endowed the press with liberty, it also imposed on it a
trusteeship that it may not abandon or prostitute in the exercise of
its freedom." 97 And it was the abandonment and prostitution of this
civic duty which had excited the Dade County judges in this instance.
To this point Terrell had rested his opinion on the notion that
contempt was necessary to prevent the scandalizing of the court. The
law as announced in 1945 was a good copy of the same doctrine
applied in the Hayes case of 1916. But Terrell suddenly shifted the
focus of his reasoning to the pendency of the criminal cases, a point
which lay at the heart of the contempt action. Without demonstrating
how one could have considered the cases to have been pending, Terrell
assumed their pendency and added another pillar to support the con-
tempt ruling fashioned by the circuit court. "The theory of our
system of fair trial is that the determination of every case should be
induced solely by evidence and argument in open court and the law
applicable thereto and not by any outside influence, whether of private
talk or public print."98 Terrell rejected the notion that a judge of
ordinary firmness would not be "disturbed or perhaps thrown off the
beam by assaults of the character shown here ...... 9 Such a belief
simply assumed "a trend in the mass mind that common experience
knows nothing about."'100 That Terrell devoted very little space and
reasoning to the pendency argument was probably indicative of the
role pendency played in the case before him. He perhaps felt the topic
needed comment, but he was not prepared to rest the conviction on
the pendency of cases which were not in fact pending at all.10 1
The editor and his newspaper won only two justices away from
Terrell's double-barreled opinion. Justice Buford obtained support
from Justice Sebring in dissent. For the minority neither the editorials
nor the cartoon imputed "a want of fairness, impartiality, or integrity
to any Judge or any Court." The items instead criticized "a judicial
system which, to protect the rights of the righteous, must, by the same
97. Id.
98. Id. at 886.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. "The Florida court . . . did not define 'pending,' and the grounds for its
decision had no special dependence on the requirement that a case be pending ...
[T]he decisive consideration is whether the judge or the jury is, or will soon be,
formulating a decision which a questioned comment seeks to affect. In this case the
petitioners . . . criticized what the court had already 'put in the scales, not by
attempting themselves to insert weights' in the balance of justice." F. THAYER, LEGAL
CONTROL OF THE PaRss 526 (3d ed. 1956).
COURTS AND THEIR CRITICS
token, see that the alleged rights of the unrighteous are determined. '"102
The dissent made clear that, whatever the Florida law of contempt had
previously been, the Bridges decision commanded the field in 1945.
"[I]n the absence of showing of clear and present danger of influencing
or controlling the determination in any particular case, then pending
in any court, created by the publication complained of, no punishable
contempt is made to appear."'103
The dissenting views of Justices Buford and Sebring received
vindication when the United States Supreme Court accepted review of
the Pennekamp case in 1946 and reversed the decision of the Florida
court. 0 4 Justice Terrell had challenged the Court's interpretation of
the applicability of the first amendment to the states and had attempted
to remove most of the meaning from the Bridges decision. The Justices
in Washington realized that the new law of contempt, the foundations
of which they had laid only a few years before, would never become
permanent if they permitted the state courts to apply such a watered-
down construction of Bridges. The Pennekamp decision by the Supreme
Court of Florida flew in the face of too many federal decisions to be
allowed to stand.
Justice Reed wrote for the majority of the Supreme Court.10 ' In a
direct rebuke to the Florida court, Reed reminded his readers that
there was indeed a national standard of free expression which the
fourteenth amendment made applicable to the states. While the right
to express one's views was not unlimited, the Constitution tipped the
scales in favor of free speech and press.
102. 22 So. 2d at 887.
103. Id. A student of the judicial process would like to know the sources judges
find impressive and persuasive when deciding cases and writing opinions. The Pennekamp
file in the clerk's office in the Supreme Court Building in Tallahassee contains several
well-worn and well-marked articles and briefs, parts of which appeared in Terrell's
opinion for the majority. Giles J. Patterson, himself the author of a book on the
freedom of the press, submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the state's position.
And Terrell's theory of the fourteenth amendment with its narrowed scope came directly
from Giles's brief. The file also contains a clipping from the Miami Daily News, the
Herald's competitor. An article of June 15, 1945, criticizes the Herald for having the
judges' "honor and integrity publicly crucified on a cross nailed together from crate-
sticks of inaccurate and irresponsible reporting." A clipping from The Charlotte Ob-
server, June 14, 1945, carries a Princeton, New Jersey, dateline. The article quotes
Byron Price as saying, "Because in a democracy public opinion holds the power of life
and death over public issues and public men, we must do what we can to raise the
level of public opinion ever higher."
104. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
105. Justice Jackson was in Nuremberg at the time and took no part in the con-
sideration or decision of the case. Chief Justice Stone, who presided at the hearing,
died before the Court announced the decision.
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Discussion that follows the termination of a case may be inadequate
to emphasize the danger to public welfare of supposedly wrongful
judicial conduct. It does not follow that public comment of every
character upon pending trials or legal proceedings may be as free
as a similar comment after complete disposal of the litigation. Be-
tween the extremes there are areas of discussion which an under-
standing writer will appraise in the light of the effect on himself
and on the public of creating a clear and present danger to fair
and orderly judicial administration .... In the borderline instances
where it is difficult to say upon which side the alleged offense falls,
we think the specific freedom of public comment should weigh
heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 10 6
Examining the record and the circumstances, Reed concluded that the
criticism leveled at the Dade County Circuit Court was not of the
type to affect directly the administration of justice.107 The danger, if
any existed, had "not the clearness and immediacy necessary to close
the door of permissible public comment. When that door is closed, it
closes all doors behind it."'08
In the Pennekamp decision, the Supreme Court attempted to
append the clear and present danger test to the contempt law of
Florida. The Florida Supreme Court had given little attention to
the test in its own opinion and had instead applied the old Hayes
doctrine to Pennekamp's editorials. The United States Supreme Court
provided in effect a de novo review, for the Justices were concerned
with a test which the Florida court had hardly considered.
"Clear and present danger" was a legal catch phrase. 10 9 Like the
reasonable tendency rule which it replaced, clear and present danger
saw service in contempt law, stirring both favorable and unfavorable
responses. Earlier catchwords or test phrases in contempt law included
the reasonable tendency and the integrity tests. Each rule embodied a
concept to someone, at some time, concerning the proper scope of the
contempt power regarding out-of-court remarks.110
106. 328 U.S. at 346-47 (footnote omitted).
107. Id. at 348.
108. Id. at 350.
109. For a discussion of the test, see Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-From
Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 313 (1952).
110. When discussing rules, catchwords, and the like, one should remember Wesley
McCune's statement that "catchwords passed over lightly today frequently become whole
doctrines in the next generation of law, or the one after that." W. MCCUNE, THE
NINE YOUNG MEN 211 (1969). Neither was Cardozo silent on this point. "[Concepts] are
tyrants rather than servants when treated as real existences and developed with merciless
disregard of consequences to the limit of their logic." B. CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF
LEGAL SCIENCE 61 (1970) (footnote omitted).
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The integrity doctrine empowered a court to punish any and all
remarks detracting from the dignity of the tribunal. The power was
an august one, and provided the basis for most American appellate
decisions regarding contempt convictions for out-of-court statements.
In Florida the integrity argument formed the foundation for the Hayes
decision of 1916, though the test later had to share quarters with the
reasonable tendency rule.
The reasonable tendency test could be viewed as a more narrow
basis for contempt than the integrity rule, since it declared comment
contemptuous only when the words tended to obstruct justice."' No
judge ever explained what obstructing justice actually meant or in-
volved, but the reasonable tendency test usually excluded from the
scope of contempt remarks directed solely at the judge or the court
which had no bearing on pending cases. The clear and present danger
concept went a step further in restricting punishment for out-of-court
contempt and in a sense was the "great tendency" test. Essentially,
as applied in contempt cases, the test required that danger to the ad-
ministration of justice be imminent.
State judges in Florida seemed especially reluctant to apply the
clear and present danger test in their contempt law. The reason was
apparent. Under the clear and present danger rule, to punish someone
for contempt would entail an admission by the judge that he lacked
the strength, stamina, or fortitude to withstand whatever comment or
criticism was circulating about him in the community. 112 State judges
recognized this point, and, when they used the test at all, they rested
their logic upon the older tests. In punishing an outspoken critic for
impugning judicial integrity or for tending to obstruct justice, the
judge did not have to admit weakness on his part. In the first instance,
he protected the good name of the court, with or without the presence
of an obstruction. In the second, he ruled that the language at issue
111. Elisha Hanson, who served as counsel for The Miami Herald in the Pennekamp
case, wrote as early as 1942:
The "reasonable tendency" test is so vague in its contours as to spread a
"dragnet which may enmesh anyone" who ventures to comment upon pending
court proceedings. To sanction such a nebulous standard as a measure of power
is to sanction a pervasive threat of censorship which is aggravated by the very
nature of summary punishment for contempt.
Hanson, The Supreme Court on Freedom of the Press and Contempt by Publication,
27 CORNELL L.Q. 165, 179 (1942).
112. "No judge could be expected to say that he or his colleagues were, or might
be, directly influenced to alter their decision by any publication. Yet many judges
are willing to admit that some publications may exert the more subtle influence of
disturbing the delicate balance of mind without which a calm perusal of the issues
is impossible." Comment, Free Speech vs. The Fair Trial in the English and American
Law of Contempt by Publication, 17 U. Cmi. L. REv. 540, 547 (1950).
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would tend to affect the proceedings of the "average" court under the
"average" judge, specifically designating himself as above average. The
effect of the clear and present danger test, then, was the quashing of
judicial power to summarily punish out-of-court remarks without
dissolving the power per se.115
The phrases "clear and present danger," "reasonable tendency,"
and "integrity" were merely shorthand references for different ap-
proaches to resolving the conflict between free expression and an in-
dependent judiciary. The phrases reflected in part the differing opinions
as to how much criticism a judge or tribunal could or should take,
while at the same time maintaining some semblance of independence.
But these shorthand expressions required interpretation and applica-
tion. Thus one judge would see a reasonable tendency where another
would not. A Frankfurter would be inclined to check for a strong
tendency to obstruct, while a Terrell would take only a passing glance
at the record. Likewise, both a Douglas and a Sebring could speak in
terms of clear and present danger, but what was clear and present
to the latter would often be vague and distant to the former. Similarly,
Florida's Justice Whitfield perceived no tendency in 1923, but the
same justice found tendency galore in 1935.114
Significantly, the move to deflate the contempt power began as
students of law and the judicial process were replacing the judiciary's
divine gowns with fallible human garments.1 1 5 At a time when studies
stressed the subjective role of personality and personal preferences
113. "Place the test on the success or failure of the press comment to obstruct
justice in pending litigations and you have no test at all. For all practical purposes
freedom of the press becomes absolute within the confines of this controversy." Com-
ment, A Re-Examination of Bridges v. California, 23 ALBANY L. REv. 61, 73 (1959).
114. Compare Cormack v. Coleman, 161 So. 844 (Fla. 1935) with Ex parte Biggers,
95 So. 763 (Fla. 1923) and Ex parte Earman, 95 So. 755 (Fla. 1923).
One sometimes wonders how much thought judges give to the full meaning and
premises of the tests they apply. As Holmes stated:
My object is not so much to point out what seems to me to be fallacies in
particular cases as to enforce by various examples and in various applications the
need of scrutinizing the reasons for the rules which we follow, and of not being
contented with hollow forms of words merely because they have been used
very often and have been repeated from one end of the union to the other.
We must think things not words, or at least we must constantly translate our
words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to keep to the real
and the true.
Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899).
115. See, e.g., B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); J. FRANK,
LAw AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function
of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Llewellyn, Some
Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). Also
note the helpful bibliographical notes in W. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY
(1971).
COURTS AND THEIR CRITICS
in adjudication, the clear and present danger test removed a formidable
hindrance to criticism of the judiciary. If the begowned individual
was not divine, comment about him could not be blasphemous. Given
the factors which supposedly guided judges in their decisions, the
change in contempt law was a recognition that additional sources of
stimulus and influence would do no harm. Supporters of the clear and
present danger rule argued that judges could not be isolated from
society and from opinions about themselves. 116 They perhaps saw little
difference between a bitter attack in the press and unfriendly remarks
at the country club or at the bar association meeting-at least as far
as the effect on thinking was concerned. In the absence of probable
harm, these spokesmen cast their vote for free expression.
Initiation of the clear and present danger test in American con-
tempt law also resulted from recognition of the possibility of abuse
under the old rules. Even when the offended judge did not himself
conduct the summary hearing, only a thin line existed between
sufficient and insufficient tendency or between friendly jibes and
wounded dignity. To predict obstructions to justice and to measure
tarnish on the judicial crest required a judgment from one's own
observations, and it was all too easy to find the necessary tendency
or tarnish when the criticizing party was unfriendly, objectionable, or
downright unpalatable. Even the most honest but nonetheless sub-
jective mind could unknowingly transform summary punishment into
a weapon of political warfare or a tool of personal vindictiveness.17
Because of the weaknesses of the old rules, a majority of the
Justices on the United States Supreme Court after 1941 felt that,
whatever the evils incurred by the free play of judicial criticism, the
advantages of such free comment far outweighed the disadvantages.' ns
116. See, e.g., Forer, A Free Press and a Fair Trial, 39 A.B.A.J. 800 (1953).
Those who believe that the judge must be protected from the pressures of
public opinion are caught on the horns of a dilemma. For if the judge is of
such moral frailty that he must be insulated from criticism, then is not society
running a fearful risk in freeing him from public surveillance? The very judges
who most piously invoked the dignity of the court and the necessity of the con-
tempt power to punish "scandalizing" the court in order to preserve public respect
have been those most properly fearful of exposure of their own misconduct.
Id. at 844.
117. Moreover,
The harm of repression is hardly cured by the fact that matter published
after a case is no longer pending is not subject to contempt. Modern criminal
prosecutions last for many months, even years, and often result in several trials
on one issue or related issues. When unrestricted comment finally becomes per-
missible, it is of little interest or utility-freedom to publish something when
it no longer matters is no freedom at all.
Note, Contempt by Publication, 59 YALE L.J. 534, 541 (1950) (footnote omitted).
118. At least one editor is aware of his newspaper's power:
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Difficulties with the clear and present danger test persisted, however,
not the least of them being the reluctance of any judge to cite for
contempt on that basis alone. This reluctance and the resulting free-
dom for the press perhaps lay behind the Supreme Court's new direc-
tion in 1941.
Though the Justices in Washington did not hesitate to accept their
new leadership in state contempt law, the justices in Tallahassee
were less than eager to acknowledge that assumption of command. In
the years after John Pennekamp crossed Judges Barns and Wiseheart
in Miami, 119 no contempt case involving out-of-court comment came
before the Florida appellate courts, but related cases indicated that
if the Florida judiciary had swallowed Pennekamp, it had failed to
digest the decision.
A case in 1946 involving an attorney's petition brought forth a
broad restatement of the contempt rule as it had existed in the Earman
and Biggers cases of 1923. "As a general rule, any publication tending
to intimidate, influence, impede, embarrass or obstruct courts in the
due administration of justice in matters pending before them constitutes
contempt. ' ' 120 This repudiation occurred hardly before the ink was dry
in the Pennekamp decision. In 1955 the Florida justices again mumbled
discontent over the exalted position enjoyed by the Pennekamp
ruling. "The Pennekamp case as misconstrued and misinterpreted has
been adopted by some as the beacon light and Bible, shield and pro-
tector, of those who would destroy public confidence in judicial
processes and eventually in the courts themselves.' 2' But the fact re-
mained that no case reached the Florida appellate courts after 1945
which directly involved out-of-court criticism of a judge. As a justice
of the Supreme Court of Florida observed more than two decades
after Pennekamp, "Newspaper comment may bother some judges, but
it shouldn't, and there is really no excuse for calling an editor to task
for what he's written about a judge."'' 2 2 A colleague added that courts
Sure, newspapers influence judges, especially at election time. A judge will want
to try a politically popular case then and he wants plenty of favorable publicity.
Judges shouldn't be influenced by what a paper says, but they are-just as they
are influenced by what the bar or other prominent groups say. But it's not
the paper's fault. We can't be held responsible for the judge's weakness.
What we need is a really independent judiciary.
Interview with John D. Pennekamp, in Miami, Florida, March 10, 1967.
119. Mr. Pennekamp crossed Judge Barns in more than one sense. The editor
said that a few hours before he received the contempt citation from Barns, the judge
passed him on the sidewalk and invited Pennekamp to attend a Rotary Club meeting
with him at noon. The citation arrived that very afternoon. Id.
120. State ex tel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 26 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1946).
121. State ex rel. Huie v. Lewis, 80 So. 2d 685, 686 (Fla. 1955).
122. The statements by the justices were made during conferences with the author,
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should use the power sparingly. "I'm for giving people the widest
latitude on what they say.''123
One would be tempted to say today that Florida's law of construc-
tive contempt blended harmoniously with the tone established by the
Supreme Court decisions in Bridges, Pennekamp, and the later case of
Craig v. Harney.124 To the extent that no appellate court in Florida
affirmed a contempt-by-publication conviction after 1945, the statement
would be an accurate one. But if one looked to judicial pronounce-
ments bordering upon contempt by publication, the answer would be
equivocal.125 The Pennekamp reprimand to the Florida courts changed
their ways but probably not all their thoughts.
March 13-14, 1967. As part of the research for this article, the author talked with several
attorneys and appellate judges in Florida. Anonymity was a condition of the conferences
cited here.
123. Id.
124. 331 U.S. 367 (1947). The opinion strengthened Pennekamp.
125. An article published in 1965 summarized Florida's test for constructive con-
tempt as "the reasonable tendency of the acts to obstruct, embarrass, or impede the
efficient administration of justice." Whether the author intended to include publications
and other out-of-court comment within the definition is unclear. Note, Criminal Con-
tempt Procedure in Florida-Proposals, 18 U. FLA. L. REV. 78, 79 (1965) (footnote
omitted).
In Clemmons v. State, 141 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1962), modified, 150 So. 2d
231 (Fla. 1963), the appellate courts ruled that under the circumstances of the case,
the trial judge could not hold the entire grand jury in contempt for remarks made in
the report of the grand jury. The First District Court of Appeal held that the grand
jury had complete immunity, but the supreme court refused to go so far, ruling that
the grand jury usually had immunity, as in the case at bar, but was subject to "reasonable
corrective measures."
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